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THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN THE
REAPPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES
ROBERT L. MONTAGUE, III*
A very significant readjustment, if not a revolution, in American
government is now in process as a result of the authority conferred
on the Federal Courts by Congress in 28 U.S.C. 1343(3) as its applica-
bility to Article 3, §2 of the Federal Constitution has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court of the United States. The need for this change
and the pressures generating it have been well discussed by a number
of writers1 and it has on occasion been described as a game of "ducks
and drakes,"2 a three-act play,3 and by other metaphors.
It is the purpose of this article to analyze the role which Federal
courts have played in this process, with particular emphasis on events
in Virginia.
The Primary Authorities
The jurisdictional provision upon which the entire role of the
Federal Courts in the reapportionment of state legislatures is premised
reads as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: ...
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States .... 4
Pursuant to the authority of this statute, during the past several
years, civil actions have been instituted all over the United States to
endeavor to use the Federal courts as the forum before which to
achieve a reduction of disparities in the weight accorded the vote of
an individual because he happens to live in one of our rapidly grow-
ing urban areas. A number of these cases were decided by the Supreme
*Robert L. Montague, I1, Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia. B.A. 1956, LL.B.
1961, University of Virginia.
2E.g., Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L.
REv. 1057 (1958).
2Lucas, Of Ducks and Drakes: Judicial Relief in Reapportionment Cases, 38
NomTE DANr LAiw. 401 (1963).
3McKay, The Federal Analogy and State Apportionment Standards, 38 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 487 (1963).
'28 US.C. § 1343(3).
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Court 5 in 1964 as a follow-up to Baker v. Carr (discussed infra) and
decisions continue to come down applying these cases. 0
The courts have derived their authority to act and to formulate
standards in reapportionment matters from the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
most particularly the last clause of that Section:
... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
7
Baker v. Carr-District Court Action
The initial impact of efforts toward readjustment was unleashed
with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Baker v.
Carr.s In that case, a group of persons qualified to vote for members
of the Tennessee legislature instituted a class action in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee for a
declaration that the Tennessee Apportionment Act of 19o was un-
constitutional and for an injunction restraining the defendants from
conducting any further elections under the Act. The basis of the action
was an alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in its utter
disregard of any standard for apportionment, with a resultant gross
disproportion of representation to voting population and the place-
ment of plaintiffs in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable
inequality.
rReynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Alabama); Pinney v. Butterworth, 378
U.S. 564 (1964) (Connecticut); Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713
(1964) (Colorado); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Swann v. Adams,
378 U.S. 553 (1964) (Florida); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. (1964) (Georgia);
Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S 560 (1964) (Illinois); Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964)
(Iowa); Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland); Marshall
v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (1964) (Michigan).
WMQA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York); Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S.
556 (1964) (Ohio); Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964) (Oklahoma); Scranton v.
Drew, 379 U.S. 40 (1964) (Pennsylvania); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia);
Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964) (Washington).
See also, Stout v. Hendricks, 228 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Ind. 1964); League of
Nebraska Muncipalities v. Marsh, 232 F. Supp. 411 (D.C. Neb. 1964); Paulson v.
Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183 (D.CN.D. 1964); Petuskey v. Clyde, 234 F. Supp. 960
(D.C. Utah 1964); Buckley v. Hoff, 234 F. Supp. 191 (D.C. Vt. 1964); Daniel v.
Davis, 220 F. Supp. 6oi (EfD. La. 1963); Baker v. Carr, 222 F. Supp. 684 (M.D. Tenn.
1963); Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D.C. Hawaii 1956).
OE.g., Swan v. Adams, 385 U.S. 44o (1967).
'U. S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1 (Emphasis added).
8369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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The case was initially dismissed by the District Court.9 This action
was in accord with an imposing array of decisions by our highest judi-
cial tribunal,10 which in the lower court's opinion, stood for the pro-
position that the question of the distribution of political strength for
legislative purposes is not an appropriate matter for Federal courts to
concern themselves with, either for lack of jurisdiction or because of
inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration.
The court reached the conclusion that even though a violation of
the plaintiff's rights under the state and Federal constitutions by the
legislature of Tennessee was clear and that the evil should be cor-
rected without delay, the remedy did not lie with the courts. The dis-
trict court found that the situation involved one of those rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution for the violation of which the courts cannot
give redress." The court appeared to be dismayed by the "political
thicket" into which it was asked to inject itself, and at the time, such
a reaction must have seemed highly appropriate. The remedies which
would have been required to effect relief, in the court's opinion, would
have amounted to a form of judicial legislation and an unwarranted
intrusion into the political affairs of the state.
Supreme Court Reaction
The Supreme Court determined that the conflict between the court's
judicial duty to protect individuals against violation of their constitu-
tutional right to equal protection of the laws and its further obligation
to avoid interference with other branches and levels of government and
intervention into political matters should be resolved differently.'
2
In holding that dismissal by the District Court was error and that
the cause should be tried, the Supreme Court noted particularly the
failure of the Tennessee General Assembly to reapportion for more
than 6o years.13 During this period substantial growth and shifts in
concentration of population occurred in Tennessee as they have
throughout many areas of the United States. The composition of the
legislature as a result of continued operation under Tennessee's 19ol
"Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (MCD. Tenn. 1959).
"Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless, 342 U.S. 920 (1956);
Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 US. 916 (1952);
South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (195o); MacDougall v. Green, 335 US. 281 (1948);
Colegrove v. Barrett, 33o U.S. 8o4 (1947); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946);
Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"179 F. Supp. 824, 828 (1959); see also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556
(1946).
"369 US. 186 (1962).
2Id. at 191.
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Apportionment Act14 was such that redress of the situation was most
unlikely to be forthcoming from that body, although no one could
dispute that it was clearly the most appropriate organ to undertake
action to correct the problem. In the case of Tennessee, the matter was
further aggravated by the fact that the second most appropriate alter-
native, popular initiative, is not provided for in that state.15
Federal Courts Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court was then faced with a constitutional claim resting
squarely, although not solely, upon an alleged violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment's "equal protection" clause, and found it unneces-
sary to go further in developing a basis for consideration of plaintiff's
case.16 The circumstances were such as to cause the Court to conclude
that it could not assume a role of impotence to correct the violation.
The Court held that the matter was a substantial one arising under
the Constitution to which the judicial power extends under Article 3,
Section 2 of the Constitution, and was therefore within the scope of
28 U.S.C. 1343 (3), and that the District Court had jurisdiction of the
subject matter, regardless of whether the claim might later be estab-
lished on its merits.
The Political Question is Justiciable
The Court further reviewed the matter of justiciability and the
presentation of a "political question," and held that a "challenge to
an apportionment presents no non-justiciable 'political question'."'17
The point was brought out in discussion that the mere fact that a
suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean that it pre-
sents a political question.
Consideration of a substantial body of political question cases led
the Court to the conclusion that it is the relationship between the
judiciary and coordinate branches of the Federal government and not
the Federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to
the political question theory. The non-justiciability of a political
question was found to be primarily a function of the separation of
powers rather than a product of the state-Federal relationship. The
Court failed to evaluate adequately the fact that it was being asked
IAActs of i9ol, S.J. Res. No. 35; Acts of igol, c. 122.
13 6 9 U.S. 186, 193, n.14 (1962).
"Old. at 195, n.15.
" Id. at 2o9.
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to review an essentially legislative function even though that func-
tion would be performed by State legislatures, but instead, chose
simply to look upon the political question doctrine as ".... a tool for
maintenance of governmental order,.. .not (to be) so applied as to
promote only disorder."' 8 The Court also indicated that Federal
courts should not stand for a "manifestly unauthorized exercise of
power."' 9
The Court synopsized the factors which it had distilled from the
political question cases in reaching a conclusion on the issue of justi-
ciability in the following language:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a po-
litical question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.20
These factors easily could have been applied to reach a different
conclusion had the Court chosen to view the legislative function as
a concept apart from the level of its exercise. But the Court was
determined to deal effectively with the question which is ultimately
involved in Baker v. Carr and all state legislative apportionment
cases-the consistency of state action with the Federal Constitution-
the resolution of which involves perhaps a partial abandonment of
traditional political question precepts, although the Court did not
face the point quite so frankly.
At this point, the role which the Court appeared to have fashioned
for itself was one of toleration of the exercise of state power wholly
within the domain of state interest insulated from judicial review, but
it would not permit this insulation to carry over to situations where
state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally
protected right.
Reaction to the Decision
The awareness of the several Justices of the impact of their decision
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flected in some of the concurring opinions, 21 as is the Court's aware-
ness of the fact that the root of the problem lies in what the state
legislatures have or have not done with respect to reapportionment,
rather than in weaknesses in state constitutional policy.22
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan view the opinion
of the majority with outspoken disapprobation. Their feeling is
shared by a substantial body of patriotic and thoughtful citizenry
throughout the country; and indeed this case has become one of sev-
eral focal points in a continuing discussion of the relationship between
the states and the Federal government.
23
Criticism of Criticism
These critics, while making some valid legal objections, tend to ig-
nore a most important point made by a State Senator and member
of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government. 24 His com-
ment illustrates a basic fallacy in their viewpoint, derived from its
assumption that the states are sovereign, and therefore immune from
certain restraints. Sovereignty under our Constitution resides with
the people and they have delegated certain of its attributes to the
agents they have found it necessary or desirable to establish, the states
and the central government.25 This delegation has not included per-
mission to flaunt with impunity requirements of Federal and State
Constitutional law relating to reapportionment. Neither of these
agents should be permitted to forget for whose benefit they act or to
become unrepresentative of the people. Nothing could be more basic
to the survival of our system of government.
This view of the matter is actually entirely consistent as a matter
of logic with the feelings of those who strive to maintain the basic
constitutional precepts upon which our nation is established and more
particularly the relative status of the states in the overall plan for
our government. As is pointed out in the brief for Appellees in the Vir-
ginia Reapportionment case, genuinely representative state govern-
ments responsive to the needs of their citizens, can reverse the trend of
increasing federalism, and may serve the cause of states' rights, 20 once
the state governments are positioned with respect to the people in a
MId. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
nId. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring).
2E.g., VA. -COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOV'T, THE TENNESSEE REAPPORTION-
MENT CASE (1962).
'4Id. at 2o-
2-U.S. CONST., Preamble; KY. CONST., Preamble.
-Brief for Appellee at 16, Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
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manner that will insure acceptance of the responsibilities that go with
those rights. It is unreasonable to assume or expect that states' rights
may achieve respect in an atmosphere of detachment from the elec-
torate on the part of state governments.
Reynolds v. Sims
Baker v. Carr made it clear that the Federal Courts can and will
take effective action to assure fair and reasonable apportionment of
state legislative seats. Subsequent decisions have indicated the stand-
ards and remedies which the Federal courts will apply, Reynolds v.
Sims,27 being the lead-off of a new series of decisions by the Supreme
Court in this field in 1964. This case deserves particular consideration
because as the Court points out, it "is signally illustrative of the
seriousness of this problem in a number of states." 28
This case began as a challenge by certain taxpayers and voters
of two urban Alabama counties of the validity of the existing appor-
tionment provisions of the Alabama legislature, which created a 35-
member state senate elected from 35 districts varying in population
from 15,417 to 634,864 and a io6-member state house of representatives
with population-per-representative variances from 10,726 to 43,303;
and a "standby" statutory measure creating a 35-member state senate
elected from 35 districts varying in population from 31,175 to 634,864,
and a io6-member state house of representatives with population-per-
representative variances from under 20,000 to over 52,000.
The three-judge district court held all three schemes unconstitu-
tional, and in order to "break the stranglehold" of the rural counties
on the legislature so that it could reapportion itself, the court ordered
a temporary reapportionment following the proposed amendment's
provision with respect to the state house of representatives and the
standby statutory measure's provisions with respect to the state senate.29
The United States Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal hold-
ing that the equal protection clause requires that the seats in both
houses of a bicameral legislature be apportioned on a population
basis as a fundamental constitutional requirement-thus indicating the
source from which applicable standards for an apportionment would
be derived. The Court flatly rejected the possible applicability of the
7"377 U.S. 533 (1964).
92o8 F. Supp. 431.
2377 U.S. 533, 569 (1964).
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Federal analogy as a basis for a state legislative apportionment scheme.
Pursuant to the foregoing principles, the Court found the three
Alabama plans in question unconstitutional as a whole and in their
separate parts relating to the respective houses of the legislature. The
District Court's action in ordering a temporary reapportionment to
"break the stranglehold" was approved as an appropriate remedy
in the situation.
Mathematical Precision Not Required
Though holding as it did, the Court yet took pains to make it clear
that what the constitution required through the Equal Protection
Clause was that
"a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct
districts in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal
population as practicable.... [recognizing] that it is a practi-
cal impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one
has an identical number of residents, or citizens or voters. Math-
ematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitu-
tional requirement." 30
The Court would permit the use of political subdivision lines in
establishing contiguous districts so long as the resulting apportion-
ment was based substantially on population and the dilution of the
equal population principle was insignificant. The Court refrained
from spelling out any more precise constitutional test, leaving this to
be developed on a case by case basis by lower courts in the context
of actual litigation, but indicated that:
"so long as the divergences from a strict population standard
are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectua-
tion of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal
population principle are constitutionally permissible with
respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both houses
of a bicameral state legislature."' 1
But the emphasis must be on people, not history or economic in-
terests or area and geography.
'0377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). See Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 5o
(1931) wherein the Court states: "We must remember that the machinery of gov-
ernment would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints."
3'377 US. 533, 579 (1964). See also, Dison, Apportionment Standards and Judi-
cial Power, 38 NOTRE DAME LAw. 367 (1963).
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The Court suggests a possible solution to the dilemma created by
the conflicting desire to represent each political subdivision and still
maintain equal population as the basis for apportionment-create sub-
stantially more seats in the legislature than there are counties which
is clearly within the discretion of each state.
32
A decennial reapportionment appears to be the Court's objective,
and where malapportionment can be corrected by enforcement of com-
pliance with state constitutional requirements, this is the appropriate
remedy, but the mandate of the equal protection clause must be com-
plied with regardless of existing state law.33
As to remedies, once a given apportionment scheme has been found
unconstitutional, the Court talks rather gingerly, but clearly implies
that a Court would be justified in taking action to insure no further
elections are conducted under the invalid plan, either immediately
or at a more appropriate time-proximity of an election being consider-
ed in accordance with equitable principles.
The allowance of adequate time for corrective action by the state's
legislature, which the Court recognizes as the most appropriate organ
for action, is proper and appropriate. Upon the legislature's failure
to take effective action to remedy the state's legislative apportionment
scheme, the court may order a temporary provisional plan into effect.
Davis v. Mann
Of particular interest and pertinence to Virginia was the com-
panion case of Davis v. Mann,3 4 decided on the same day and as a
part of a series of decisions handed down by the Court dealing with the
reapportionment of state legislatures. 35 This case began in the Eastern
District of Virginia 36 as a challenge of the constitutionality of the
apportionment of seats in the Virginia General Assembly under which
in the state senate, the population per senator disparities among the
districts ranged from 61,730 to 163,401 with 41.1 per cent of the
state's population electing a majority of the state senate, and in the
state house of delegates, the population per delegate disparities among
the districts ranged from 21,825 to 95,064, with 40.5 per cent of the
state's population electing a majority of the house.
The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal from a
"377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964). See McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Re-
apportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MxcH. L. REV. 645, 698-699 (1963).
3'377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964).
m377 U.S. 678 (1964).
uNote 5, supra.
3'213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1963).
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decision holding that the apportionment was invalid as violative of
the equal protection clause.
37
The relief sought in the case included (1) a declaratory judgment
that the statutory scheme of legislative apportionment in Virginia,
prior as well as subsequent to the 1962 amendments, contravenes the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is thus
unconstitutional and void, which was granted; (2) the issuance of a
prohibitory injunction restraining defendants from performing their
official duties relating to the election of members of the general as-
sembly pursuant to existing statutory provisions, which was granted
but stayed in effect until January 31, 1963, to give time for the legis-
lature to act or an appeal to be taken; and (3) a mandatory injunction
requiring defendants to conduct the next primary and general elec-
tions for legislators on an at-large basis throughout the state, which,
as circumstances developed, did not become necessary.
Virginia Requirements
Reapportionment in Virginia is governed by state constitutional
requirements setting the number of senators at no more than 4o nor
less than 33 and the number of delegates at no more than ioo nor
less than go, with reapportionment to take place at least decennially.
38
This had been carried out by the Legislature in 1932, 1942, 1952, and
1962. The last two instances were done in a manner reflecting the
Legislature's growing distaste for the process. The 1952 reapportion-
ment was done by a special session of the Virginia Legislature after
the regular session had adjourned without action on the matter.
In 1962, the Legislature was presented with alternative plans pre-
pared by a gubernatorial commission on redistricting with aid of the
Bureau of Public Administration of the University of Virginia. The
Bureau prepared two schemes for apportionment of the House and
three for apportionment of Senate seats following various criteria
considered in previous apportionments, and complying with the consti-
tutionally prescribed size limitations on both of the houses. The
Commission's actual recommendation differed from the Bureau's
plans, being based on political compromise, and deviated further from
population-based representation. At the 1962 regular session, the Gen-
eral Assembly completely disregarded all of these ideas and adopted
apportionment schemes of its own, making only minimal changes in
existing statutory provisions, which resulted ultimately in litigation.
3-Ibid.
'VA. CONST. art. 4 §§ 41, 42, 43.
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While requiring an apportionment decennially, the Virginia Con-
stitution contains no express standards thus leaving the matter to the
sole discretion of the Legislature. However, population has been the
most important factor for legislative consideration in reapportioning
and redistricting. The Legislature has also consistently refrained from
splitting or dividing cities or counties whose populations entitle them
to more than one representative, so that there have always been less than
ioo delegate districts and less than 40 senatorial districts. Because of a
tradition of respecting the integrity of the boundaries of cities and
counties in drawing district lines, districts have been constructed only
of combinations of counties and cities and not by pieces of them which
has resulted in occasional utilization of floterial districts. 39 Various
other factors, in addition to population, utilized in enacting appor-
tionment statutes by the Virginia Legislature have included com-
pactness and contiguity of territory forming a district, geographic and
topographic features, and community of interests among the people in
various districts.
The 1962 amendment to the Virginia Code40 which provided for
the apportionment of the State Senate, divided the State into 36 sena-
torial districts for the allocation of 40 seats. Under 196o population
figures, each senator would ideally have representated 99,174 persons
but the statute gave senators from the complaining jurisdictions in
Davis v. Mann4' up to 163,401 constituents while leaving the smallest
senatorial district only 61,73o.42 The population variance ratio of
2.65 to 1 is self-evident. Approximately 41.1 per cent of the State's
population could elect a majority of the State Senate.
A similar situation prevailed with respect to the House under the
1962 statute,43 which created 70 House districts among which the ioo
House seats were distributed. Ideally, each delegate would have rep-
resented 39,669 persons, but the average population per delegate in
Fairfax County was 95,664 while Shenandoah County with only
1The term "floterial district" is of particular interest to this writer. It is used
to refer to a legislative district which includes within its boundaries two or more
political subdivisions which independently would not be entitled to additional
representation but whose conglomerate population entitles the entire area to an-
other seat in the particular legislative body being apportioned. One such district
was created to represent the City of Alexandria and Fairfax County as a result
of Davis v. Mann, and this writer was a candidate for that seat in the Democratic
primary election of 1965.
'OVA. CODE ANN. § 24-14 (Supp. 1962).
"Arlington 9, Fairfax Counties and the City of Norfolk.
'2213 F. Supp. 577, 518-82 (1962).
'3VA. CODE ANN. § 24-12 (Supp. 1962).
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21,825 persons and Wythe County with 21,975 each had one delegate
to the Virginia House. The maximum population variance ratio of
4.36 to i is once again self-evident. Approximately 406.5 per cent of the
state's population lived in districts which could elect a majority of
the House.
The Court in Davis v. Mann could not ascertain the existence of
an adequate political remedy by which legislative reapportionment
could be obtained,4 4 since Virginia, like Tennessee, has no provision
for the initiative procedure. An approach to this through amendment
of the Virginia Constitution would require a vote of a majority of
both houses of the Virginia General Assembly.4
5
Judicial relief from state Courts appeared as an alternative possible
source of corrective action in view of the decision by the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in Brown v. Saunders,4 6 wherein the Vir-
ginia Court held a congressional districting statute invalid be-
cause it conflicted with Virginia constitutional requirements47 of
equally populated congressional districts. Thus, there was precedent
for the justiciability of apportionment questions, but only in the con-
text of a clear state constitutional requirement which does not exist
with respect to the state legislature. The failure of the Circuit Court
of the City of Richmond to act on, and indeed to dismiss on its merits,
a suit filed shortly after the Federal District Court proceeding48 is
perhaps indicative of the result that might have occurred had resort
to state courts been pursued in this instance.
A contrary result was obtained from the United States Supreme
Court, which upheld the finding of the District Court that the Vir-
ginia legislative apportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause,
even though the Legislature in Virginia was not so malapportioned as
had been the case in Alabama, Tennessee and elsewhere, and had
been apportioned periodically.49 Virginia's prime failure was simply
an insufficient compliance with Federal constitutional prerequisites.
Proffered explanations in terms of military and other transient
personnel were rejected as insufficient justification for the imbalance, as
was the inconsistent suggestion of an effort to balance urban and rural
" 377 U.S. 678, 689 (1964). But this may not have been a significant factor in
the decision. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S.
713, 736-37 (1964).
"VA. CONsT. art. 15 § 196-197.
15159 Va. 28, ioS S.E. 105 (1932).
'WA. CONST. art. 4 § 55.
"Tyler v. Davis, filed in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond, March 26,
1963.
"D377 U.S. 678, 69o-91 (1964).
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power-when considered in light of a comparison of the Richmond area
with the complaining urban areas.50 The Court tacitly approved use of
the equitable remedies sought in the District Court, if their use should
become necessary after allowing the Legislature ample time to enact a
constitutionally valid scheme in time for the 1965 election.
This approach proved successful, as is reflected in the work of the
Special Session of the 1964 General Assembly;51 Virginia adjusted her
state legislative apportionment in a manner which made it unnecessary
for the jurisdiction retained by the District Court to be invoked for
purposes of enforcing its order of November 28, 1962,52 or for further
proceedings to be had such as were necessitated in Swann v. Adams.53
Subsequent Litigation
However, activity and debate have continued, and the District
Court has been requested to review certain facets of the aforecited
1964 apportionment statutes, particularly those provisions thereof
creating an eight-member district encompassing Richmond and Hen-
rico County, and those relating to Shenandoah County.5 4 In a decision
subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court,55 the Richmond-Henrico
floterial district was sustained in the face of a claimed violation of
the rights of Negroes to a chance to elect one of their race to the
General Assembly. The Court indicated that "Government has no
business designing election districts along racial or religious lines."56
However, it was found that an invidious discrimination had been
visited upon Shenandoah County in joining it with a district contain-
ing 9o,76o people, far above the ideal figure of 39,669. With respect
to this point only, the Court set aside the 1964 apportionment of the
5oth and 5 9 th districts. It ordered in lieu thereof that the counties
of Page, Rockingham, Shenandoah and the City of Harrisonburg
be assigned two delegates to represent all four of these political sub-
divisions jointly to provide for a representation of 45,38o persons
per delegate.
In all other respects the Court approved the 1964 Reapportion-
ment Acts in order to remove any question as to the validity of subse-
quent legislative enactments. This case appears to have marked the
50Id. at 691.
G'Va. Acts of 1964, chs. 1, 2 at 3-5.
WaMann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Va. 1964).
13385 U.S. 44o (1967).
r'245 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va. 1964).
-Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965); Thornton v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965).
rWMann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241, 242 (E.D. Va. 1964), citing Wright v. Rocke-
feller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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end of litigation in Virginia over the 1964 apportionment, and with
its earlier companion decisions, leaves a clear impression of what may
be anticipated from Federal Courts in Virginia in the way of applicable
standards and appropriate remedies. The major precedents have come
down in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, leaving the District
Courts primarily with considerable discretion as to the application of
remedies, but with rather less discretion as to deviations from the
"one man, one vote" standard.
Conclusion
Indeed, at this point in the evolution of the role of Federal
Courts in the apportionment of state legislatures, it is becoming
abundantly clear that Federal equal protection standards will be ap-
plied regardless of what other rational basis may exist for a plan and
what given state constitutions may have to say on the subject. It is
now equally clear that those standards will be enforced by the appli-
cation of drastic equitable remedies, albeit with restraint wherever
restraint will suffice. In a complex society such as ours, it is not im-
pertinent to debate the wisdom of almost total reliance upon the
population standard in the apportionment of both houses of bi-
cameral state legislatures, and the debate does continue although
shifting more to the legislative arena for the present.
57
The real battle to determine the future of standards in this field is
in fact being waged in the United States Senate under the leadership
of Senator Everett Dirksen, who has headed efforts to bring about
action to inject other standards into apportionment schemes through
Federal legislative action and Constitutional Amendment, on the one
hand, and Senators Tydings and Proxmire on the other, and in state
legislatures throughout the country, thirty of which have to date
passed resolutions petitioning Congress to call a constitutional con-
vention for the purpose of proposing a constitutional amendment
which would permit the apportionment of one house of bicameral
state legislatures on the basis of factors other than population.58 The
Courts have played the major portion of their role, and it is now up to
the people to make the final determination as to whether they wish to
abide by the Courts' interpretation of the Constitution, or establish
the validity of other standards through legislation.
5The National Voter, April 1967, at 4.
58Id. P. 4.
